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AGENCY FACT FINDING
Walter J. Kendall III V
This presentation is not about how the agency fact
determination process is structured either internally or
externally. In other words, it is not concerned with
whether the decision is made by an ALJ, an expert panel or
the agency itself; nor is it concerned with which court
reviews agency determination or how much deference is given.
It is also not about process itself; neither due process nor
such things as ex parte communication. It is most certainly
not a presentation on the rules of evidence a la Wigmore.
It is about determining facts in an agency context.
The focus is on how agency fact determination is different
than court or legislative fact determination. What is the
significance of the kinds of facts agencies need to determine?
What is the significance of the pre-knowledge gained by
experience or expertise?
In my opinion there really is no such thing as adminis-
trative law. There is workers comp. law and welfare law and
public utility law, and occupational safety and health law.
A dozen years of teaching and ten more of agency practice
convinces me that all an administrative law person can do is
present the "problems" faced by regulators and those regulated,
and types of solutions developed. The key to this, it seems
to me, is to identify the policies or values the system has
brought to bear on recognizing and solving the problems.
This presentation owes much to the continuing inspiration
of Gellhorn and Byse's casebook. First published 47 years
ago, it is now in its 8th edition and is the work of Gellhorn,
Byse, Strause, Raskoff, and Schotland. Yet it is forever
new.
I'd like to give you 6 hypos and ask you to write down
on a piece of paper whether you would affirm the agency or
remand. Don't cheat. Write it down. Then we'll try to
develop some sense of why your lives are so difficult, by
seeing how agency determinations are different than court's.
Then we'll return to these hypos and see what we think.
1/ Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School.
i. In Cowen v. Bunting Glider Co., 159 Pa. Super 573,
19 A.2d 270 (1946) the claimant was injured during working
iours when his sweater caught fire while he was lighting a
:igarette. He was awarded workmen's compensation, and his
!mployer appealed. "[T]he case presents only one controverted
luestion: Was the act of smoking such a violation of the
mployer's direct and positive order as to take claimant out
)f the course of his employment and thereby preclude him
Erom compensation?" The record shows that defendant had
promulgated a'general rule forbidding smoking and had placed
'No Smoking' signs at various points in the plant. However,
it does not appear that such a sign was continuously displayed
Ln the men's room during claimant's term of employment .
rhere is evidence to the effect that claimant and others
.sed the men's room for smoking and that this practice was
known to supervisory officials. On the rehearing the board
Jeemed it advisable to make a personal visit to the plant in
order to further familiarize itself with the plant's physical
layout. While there, it observed that the floor of the
men's room was littered with cigarette butts, and, partly,
perhaps mainly, on that ground, the board found that the
company had condoned smoking, at least in the men's room.
The company objected. What is your ruling?
2. Matter of State Bank Charter Application of the
Security Bank, Buffalo, 606 P.2d 296 (Wyo. 1980). Following
a hearing on an application to charter what would be Buffalo's
third bank, the examiner visited town, to the knowledge of
all parties, to learn informally about a variety of community
matters important to the application; e.g., other bank
practices and general business conditions. Again, the
company objected. What ruling?
3. Hunter v. Zenith Dredoe Co., 19 N.W. 2d 795 (Minn.
1945) involved review of the Industrial Commission holding
the employee ineligible for compensation under the workmen's
compensation act. The employee had asked compensation for
disability due to an accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment as a slagger at the Zenith Dredge
Company or for disability due to an occupational disease
arising out of such employment. The employer denied these
allegations. At the close of the hearing, the referee
determined that the employee had not sustained an accidental
injury and ordered that a medical board be appointed to
determine whether the employee had been afflicted with an
occupational disease within the provisions and definitions
of the act. The medical board made its report determining
that employee was affected with synovitis of the right knee
and that synovitis was not an occupational disease within
the provisions of the act.
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The referee . . . adopted such report as part of his
findings and disallowed claimant's claim. Claimant thereupon
appealed to the industrial commission, which duly affirmed
and adopted the findings of the referee. In the memorandum
attached to the commission's decision it was stated:
* . * If the law had made this commission the
arbiter of the facts in occupational disease cases we
would have had no hesitancy upon the record before us
in holding that the petitioner was disabled as a result
of an occupational disease. We would not even have
thought it necessary to appoint a neutral physician,
who would have been subject to cross-examination.
However, the law does not make us the judges of contro-
verted medical questions involving occupational disease.
That becomes the exclusive function of the medical
board, and the medical board is not required to determine
that question upon the testimony taken before the
referee at a hearing prior to the appointment of the
medical board. The statute directed that the medical
board's findings and conclusions about controverted
medical questions were to be automatically adopted by
the commission as its decision.
Three witnesses testified before the referee as to
the nature and cause of claimant's disability. These
were claimant, Dr. F. J. Lepak, called on his behalf,
and Dr. S. S. Houkom [sic], called on behalf of the
employer and its insurer. All three testified, at
length and in detail, in ways that connected the
relator's conceded synovitis with this employment.
Thus, the claimant testified that "he worked on steel
plates in the open air, raising his right knee thereon
as he applied an air gun to such plates to remove
particles of slag . . .; that he moved about on the
plates by raising his knee, alternatively with his left
foot and walking ahead in that manner, applying the air
gun as he moved; that he first observed difficulty with
his right knee about two weeks before he was forced to
quit his employment on November 26, 1943." . .
Dr. Lepak . . . "testified that working on cold
steel plates or on cold surfaces and floors frequently
led to bursitis, and that in the shipyards where
relator was working they had similar, although not
identical, difficulties with other workers".
Dr. Houkom's testimony was to the effect, that trauma
caused by jerking of the air gun and constant contact
with the cold steel plates contributed to relator's
disability.
Counsel for claimant appealed from the Industrial
Commissioner's finding for the employer. What ruling?
4. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review v. Ceja, 427 A.2d 631 (Penn. 1981) arose from an
administrative decision that a former state employee should
be denied unemployment benefits because she had been discharged
for willful misconduct. All the evidence of that misconduct
had been presented in the form of memoranda and letters
about the claimant Ceja's employment history. Appearing pro
se, she had denied the truth of what they said but had not
objected to their admission.
When employer's representative began reading the
exhibits into the record, claimant attempted to interrupt
the presentation, but was stopped by the referee.
At the end of the submissions, when claimant again
asked, "May I say something?," the referee replied, "Yes,
but briefly". Then claimant launched into a confused and
convoluted account of the episodes detailed in the exhibits
in an attempt to answer all at once the myriad accusations
therein. The employer's documents were unsworn, subjective
statements. Would you affirm a denial?
5. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority v. Federal
Maritime Commission, 678 F.2d 327, 337-342 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
One issue in this rate-setting proceeding for intercoastal
carriers serving Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands was the
likely price of fuel during the period the proposed rates
would be in effect. One carrier submitted a forecast of
rising prices based on a statistical analysis of recent past
experience and industry projections. The commission rejected
the forecase as a deficient statistical analysis and it
determined that the proper course was a "pragmatic adjustment
of the carrier's projections". Therefore, it accepted as a
base fuel cost to be applied . . . the last known price
actually paid by PRMSA at the beginning of the test year:
* . . (a) PRMSA's last known fuel cost approximates
the test year projections of the other carriers, and
(b) all of the petroleum "trade intelligence" entered
into the record in this proceeding support [sic] the
conclusion that petroleum prices are likely to level
off the remainder of 1981.
PRMSA urges that it was improper for the agency to take
"official notice" of any leveling off of fuel prices not
contained in the submission of the parties. Is this a
proper use of official notice?
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6. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Gardner, 417 F.2d 1086 (4th
Cir. 1969), a proceeding to subject meprobamate, a
tranquilizer, to special controls under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. One issue was whether the drug had a
"potential for abuse" because supplies were readily
available outside legitimate drug channels. If this were
so, individuals, on their own initiative rather than on the
basis of medical advice, might consume the drug hazardously.
"Carter-Wallace objected to government exhibit 202, which is
a summary purporting to show, among other things, that an
audit of 99 pharmacies disclosed a shortage of 796,000
tablets of meprobamate. The shortage represented 77% of the
total amount of the drug received by the pharmacies on a
one-year period. The witness through whom the summary was
introduced was not familiar with all of the underlying data,
and some of the underlying documents were not available for
use in cross-examination." Is this admissible? Can it be
used to support a finding against the company?
Let's begin the analysis with the question of how
agency proceedings, and I'm including both adjudication and
rule making, differ from courtroom proceedings. Professor Chayes
in a seminal article "The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation," 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976), identified five
basic characteristics of a traditional private law; i.e.,
tort or contract, lawsuit. He said the lawsuit is 1) bipolar,
that is, there are two competing parties engaged in a zero-
sum activity; 2) a lawsuit is retrospective, that is, the
basic factual focus is on the past, what happened, who did
what to whom; 3) there is an interdependence between the
right/wrong and the remedy; that is, the relief is typically
compensatory or specifically injunctive; 4) a lawsuit is
self-contained. While the holding is precedential, the
situation between the parties is entire unto itself and is
not, or at least not treated as, relational or ongoing; and,
finally 5) a lawsuit is party initiated and controlled.
Most agency proceedings have none of these characteristics.
Let me go back -- which of these is characteristic of your
agency? Generally, there is a third party, the public, and
the matter not a zero-sum situation; the factual focus tends
to be future oriented; and the remedy tends to be generic
and legislative. Clearly the relationship between an agency
and the regulated entity is more like a marriage than a
one-night stand. And, finally, once an agency starts, the
parties lose control. They can want to dismiss or settle,
but such decisions are now controlled by the agency.
Thus, the agency process is profoundly different from a
court. If the courtroom is not the correct model to pattern
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after for guidance, what is? Professor Mashaw, in his
provocative study of the Social Security Disability Program
Bureaucratic Justice, sets out three models of justice and
elaborates their legitimat ing values, summary goals and
organizational structure.
2/ Other models have been elaborated. Professors Cass and
Diver, in their new casebook, build on the distinction of
Professor Michelman between public interest and public
choice explanations of governmental actions.
"In the economic or public choice model, all substantive
values or ends are regarded as strictly private and subjective.
The legislature is conceived as a market-like arena in which
votes instead of money are the medium of exchange. The rule
of majority rule arises strictly in the guise of a technical
devise for prudently controlling the transaction costs of
individualistic exchanges. Legislative intercourse is not
public-spirited, but self-interested. Legislators do not
deliberate towards goals, they dicker towards terms. There
is no right answer, there are only struck bargains. There
is no public or general or social interest, there are only
concatenations of particular interests or private pre-
ferences . .
The opposed, public-interest model depends at bottom on
a belief in the reality -- or at least the possibility -- of
public or objective values and ends for human action. In
this public-interest model the legislature is regarded as a
forum for identifying or defining, and acting towards those
ends. The process is one of mutual search through joint
deliberation, relying on the use of reason supposed to have
persuasive force. Majority rule is experienced as the
natural way of taking action as and for a group -- or as a
device for filtering the reasonable from the unreasonable,
the persuasive from the unpersuasive, the right from the
wrong and the good from the bad.
Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local
Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145 (1977).
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Features of the Justice Models
Dimension! Legitimating Primary Structure or
Model Values Goal Organization
Bureaucratic Accuracy & Program Hierarchical
Rationality Rationality Implementation
Professional Service Client Interpersonal
Treatment Satisfaction
Moral Judgment Fairness Conflict Independent
Resolution
Most of what follows on these models is in Mashaw's own
words.
Bureaucratic Rationality
Given the democratically (legislatively) approved task,
any task -- the administrative goal is to develop, at the
least possible cost, a system for distinguishing between
true and false claims. Adjudicating should be both accurate
(the legislatively specified goal) and cost-effective. This
approach can be stated more broadly by introducing trade-offs
between error, administrative, and other "process" costs
such that the goal becomes "minimize the sum of error and
other associated costs".
A system focused on correctness defines the questions
presented to it by implementing decisions in essentially
factual and technocratic terms. Individual adjudicators
must be concerned about the facts in the real world that
relate to the truth or falsity of the claimed disability.
At a managerial level the question becomes technocratic:
What is the least cost methodology for collecting and
combining those facts about claims that will reveal the
proper decision? To illustrate by contrast, this model
would exclude questions of value or preference as obviously
irrelevant to the administrative task, and it would view
reliance on nonreplicable, nonreviewable JudQment or intuition
as a singularly unattractive methodology for decision. The
legislature should have previously decided the value questions;
and decision on the basis of intuition would cause authority
to devolve from the bureau to individuals, thereby preventing
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a supervisory determination of whether any adjudicative
action taken corresponded to a true state of the world. The
general decisional technique, then, is information retrieval
and processing.
Professional Treatment
The goal of the professional is to serve the client.
The service delivery goal or ideal is most obvious, perhaps,
in the queen of the professions, medicine; but it is also a
defining characteristic of law and the ministry and of newer
professions such as social work. Although one might view
medicine, for example, as principally oriented toward
science and therefore knowledge, such a view is fundamentally
mistaken. The value to be served by the professional is the
elimination of the health complaints presented to him or her
by patients. Curing a patient by eliminating a physically
identifiable pathology may be good science, but if the
patient still feels sick it is not good medicine. The
objective is to wield the science so that it produces good
as defined by the patient. This entails interpersonal and
diagnostic intuition -- clinical intelligence -- as well as
scientific knowledge.
An administrative system for decision making based on
professional treatment would, therefore, be client-oriented.
Like bureaucratic rationality, professional judgment
requires the collection of information that may be manipulated
in accordance with standardized procedures. But in the
professional treatment model the incompleteness of facts,
the singularity of individual contexts, and the ultimately
intuitive nature of judgment are recognized, if not exalted.
Disability decisions would be viewed not as attempts to
establish the truth or falsity of some state of the world,
but rather as prognoses of the likely effects of disease or
trauma on functioning, and as efforts to support the client
while pursuing therapeutic and vocational prospects.
Moral Judgment
The traditional goal of the adjudicatory process is to
resolve disputes about rights, about the allocation of
benefits and burdens. The paradigm adjudicatory situations
are those of civil and criminal trial. The goal in individual
adjudication is to decide who deserves what.
To some degree these traditional notions of justice in
adjudicatory process imply merely getting the facts right in
order to apply existing legal rules. So conceived, the goal
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of a moral judgment model of justice is the same as that of
a bureaucratic rationality model -- factually correct
realization of previously validated legal norms. But there
is more to it than that.
The moral judgment model views decision making as value
defining. The question is not just who did what, but who is
to be preferred, all things considered, when interests and
the values to which they can be relevantly connected conflict.
This entitlement-awarding goal of the moral judgment
model gives an obvious and distinctive cast to the basic
issue for adjudicatory resolution. The issue is the
deservingness of some or all of the parties in the context
of certain events, transactions, or relationships that give
rise to a claim. This issue, in turn, seems to imply
certain things about a just process of proof and decision.
For example, given the generally threatening nature of an
inquiry into moral desert, parties should be able to exclude
from the decisional context information not directly related
to the entitlement issue that gives rise to the disputed
claim. This power of exclusion may take the form of pleading
rules, of notions of standing or proper parties, and, more
importantly, may permit total exclusion of directive judgment
where claims are abandoned or disputants come to some
mutually satisfactory agreement concerning the relevant
allocation. The goal is limited: to resolve particular
claims or entitlement in a way that fairly allocates certain
benefits and burdens, not to allocate benefits and burdens
in general in accordance with the relative deservingness of
individuals or groups. The decider is to a degree passive.
The parties control how much of their lives or relationships
is put at issue and what factual and normative arguments are
brought to bear on the resolution of the dispute.
Which model most accurately describes your agency:
bureaucratic rationality, professional treatment, or moral
judgment?
Now that we have a framework for analysis, let's look
at the ACUS recommendation 86-2 made just over a year ago --
that the Federal Rules of Evidence not be controlling in
federal agency adjudication but more precise guidelines be
adopted on the question of admissibility, specifically
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules. Professor Richard Pierce was
the consultant on this, and his views have been published in
the Administrative Law Review, volume 39, at pages 1 through
26. The same basic question, the applicability of the rules
of evidence for civil trials to agency proceedings, can be
asked about state and local agencies.
The current federal APA rule is Section 556(d). It
says in relevant part, "Any oral or documentary evidence
may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall
provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial or
unduly repetitious evidence".
The most recent Model State APA, I'm sure more than
ably discussed yesterday by my former colleague on the
Governor's Administrative Rules Commission, Howard Swiebel,
says in Section 4-212 in relevant position, "the presiding
officer shall exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial,
unduly repetitious, or excludable on constitutional or
statutory grounds or on the basis of evidentiary privilege
recognized in the courts of this state . . . Evidence may
not be excluded solely because it is hearsay".
Each agency's organic or enabling act may also have a
provision on the applicability of the Rules of Evidence and
that, of course, would be controlling.
The ACUS and Professor Pierce found 280 different sets
of evidentiary rules at the federal level ranging from no
references to evidentiary rules at all to mandatory incorpo-
ration of the FRE. The number of variations in the states
is no doubt larger, but the range is likely the same.
Assuming a statute makes the rules of evidence in civil
trials applicable, and it should be remembered that the
prior MSAPA required use of such rules of evidence unless
not reasonably possible, how have the courts responded?
Most courts recognize that despite the seemingly clear
requirements, the civil trial rules need be applied only "so
far as practicable". Professor Pierce finds the courts
"confused" in applying these requirements. Since it has
been recognized by the Supreme Court for over 80 years that
the technical rules of evidence should not apply in agency
proceedings (see Chao. B. & 0. Rwy. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585
(1907)), it is not surprising that the courts have difficulty
with legislatively imposed requirements that such rules be
applied. What is surprising is why legislatures and even
more surprisingly why agencies would voluntarily make such
rules applicable to agency proceedings.
However, when such rules are mandated, how should the
ALJ or other decision makers proceed? Each agency has
developed and had developed for it, a jurisprudence on this
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issue. That is controlling. V But it seems desirable for
groups such as yours and its affiliates to lobby the legis-
latures to eliminate requirements that court truth-seeking
rules be required in agency proceedings. I am aware that
Professor Pierce's survey data indicates that most of you
who are bound by court rules in fact are satisfied. Even
more of you use such rules for guidance in making rulings.
Nevertheless, isn't it sufficiently established that in a
paraphrase of Professor Davis by Professor Pierce "formal
rules of evidence have no place in agency proceedings
because of the many differences between agencies and courts"?
What should courts do in the meanwhile in cases raisingr
the applicability of such court evidentiary rules? Application
of such rules tends to exclude evidence that might otherwise
be considered reliable and probative. If an agency admits
such evidence, the court should affirm unless it can be
shown that the "so far as practicable" determination of the
agency was unreasonable and in fact prejudicial to the
appealing party. Such an approach permits the agency to
assess its own informational needs and at the same time
makes sure that parties are not unduly prejudiced thereby.
How have federal agencies responded to the ACUS recom-
mendation? Review of the Federal Register uncovered no
direct reference to it. However, the NRC has incorporated
the following evidentiary standard in its new Informal
Hearing Procedures for Materials Licensing Adjudications (52
F.R. 20089, May 29, 1987). "Strict rules of evidence will
not apply . . . but the presiding officer may . . . strike
any portions of a . . . presentation, or a response . . .
that is cumulative, irrelevant, immaterial or unreliable."
There are over 30 agencies with the FRE "so far as oracticable"
standard. They should eliminate it.
3/ For instance, in Illinois in a case involving the
Department of Revenue, the Supreme Court recognized that the
controlling statute made the technical rules of evidence
inapplicable, but held that the rule against hearsay "is a
basic and not a technical rule" Grand Liquor Co. v. Dept. of
Revenue, 367 N.E. 2d 1238 (Ill. 1977). In subsequent cases
involving hearsay before other agencies the Court has not
even cited this case, and allowed the use of such evidence.
Eq. Union Elec. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 444 N.E. 2d 115
(Ill. 1983).
It is clear that ALJ's prefer guidance in areas as
troublesome, recurring and essential as evidentiary rulings.
However, it is not clear why ACUS and Professor Pierce would
opt for FRE 403 as the proper guiding and evaluative standard.
The federal APA may not be sufficient support in that it
merely says irrelevant and immaterial evidence be excluded.
Clearly there is much that is relevant (FRE 401 -- evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence) that is not reliable and probative and should be
excluded even if it is not prejudicial, or would lead to
confusion or be a waste of time as is required by 403. For
instance, Judge Deese's article on Relevancy of Evidence in
your most recent journal (7 J. NA.ALJ 38 (1987) discusses;
e.g., character evidence, habit and custom, compromise and
repairs.
However and regardless, isn't it implicit in 556(d)
that exclusion is not limited to the mandated grounds?
Whatever you think of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Richardson v. Perales, it seems to me, it says that reliable
and probative evidence is allowed regardless of the technical
rules and thereby, if evidence is not reliable and probative
it need not be admitted. Of course, exclusion of evidence
is riskier than "letting it in for what it's worth," but the
ALJ should be able to rely on counsel to make an offer of
proof if she or he strongly disagrees (FRE 103.5) and
reassess the initial ruling as the proceeding unfolds.
Just so it's clear that Richardson v. Perales is not
carte blanche, let me remind you of the nine reliability
assurances that were present in that case:
1. the doctors' examination of Perales was personal;
2. their apparent lack of bias (e.g., Douglas dissent
referring to a stable of Defense Doctors);
3. the routine and standard nature of the medical
tests and procedures;
4. the range of examinations (five different specialists);
5. the consistency of result;
6. the possibility of subpoena and cross was available
in the statute;
7. courts admit it; i.e., it's o.k. under FRE;
8. the courts have lots of experience with agency use
of such data; and
9. necessity (i.e., the sheer volume of cases)
requires flexibility. (Whenever I hear such an
argument I am reminded of William Pitt's speech in
the House of Commons on November 18, 1783:
"Necessity is the plea for every infringement of
human freedom. It is the argument of tyrants; it
is the creed of slaves".)
Notice only one is the FRE and most are common sense
based on your experience as ALJ's.
Finally, what were your rulings in each of the cases?
1. Cowan v. Bunting Glider -- the no-smoking sign,








Held: Affirm -- if error, harmless;
burden on bank to show how
harmed.
3. Zenith Dredge -- the Medical Board -- agency
disagreement case, synovitis of the knee.
Affirm
Remand
Held: Unconst. Medical Board not
required to set out its findings
and reasons deprives plaintiff of
J.R.




Held: For claimant ALJ cut her off (and
didn't help her), and documents
were unreliable.





6. Carter-Wallace -- the meprobamate case.
Affirm
Remand
Held: Should not have admitted, but
lots of other evidence affirmed.
Based on your show of hands and the discussion, I take
Lt that most of you would describe your agencies as "moral
judgment" agencies. In my opinion, a review of the statutory
purposes behind most agencies shows that they were created
to replace the courts and its case law. Clearly that is
true of, among others, workers comp. agencies, the National
Labor Relations Board, and public utility commissions. A
more appropriate model for such reform agencies is the
professional treatment model. It empowers the agency (and
Administrative Law Judge) to make a record so that it comes
up with the best policy answer and is not tied to the
alternatives presented by the parties. See, e.q., Echevarria
v. Secretary, 685 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1982). Under no circum-
stances should an agency go to either the extreme of
bureaucratic rationality; i.e., just processing bodies (cf.
Association of Administrative Law Judaes v. Heckler, 594
F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984)) or that of purely ad hoc
decision making (cf. Auerbach, Justice Without Law (1983)).
In any event, how you or the courts see your agency in large
measure determines how you approach an evidence question.
Thanks. It's been fun. I hope it's been helpful.
